

A DETACHMENT OF ARTILLERISTS ARE MUCH WANTED:  
Ohio's Artillery in the War of 1812, the Militia and Regulars.

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“I hasten to apprise Your Excellency of the Capture of this very important Post ... and about 45 Pieces of Ordnance have been taken”.<sup>1</sup> With the surrender of Detroit in August 1812, the British captured a significant number of artillery pieces ranging in size from two small brass King Howitzers to several large iron 24- pounder garrison guns.<sup>2</sup> The loss of this ordnance left the Northwestern Army with no capability to conduct siege operations or otherwise provide artillery support to an army in the field. One account suggests that just two artillery pieces remained in the entire Northwest Territory after Hull's surrender.<sup>3</sup>

Before 1812, regular army artillery units in the Northwest Territory possessed a mixture of both light and heavy caliber guns scattered among posts throughout the Northwest region: Detroit, Michilimackinac, Fort Wayne, and elsewhere. Cannon were classified by the weight of shot they fired, ranging from small howitzers firing 3 pound round shot to 24-pounder garrison pieces. For service in the field, lighter caliber guns, primarily 6- and 12-pounders, were used to knock down hasty field fortifications and protect the infantry battle line. Larger caliber guns such as 18-pounders were heavy enough to batter deliberate fortifications, but still mobile enough to accompany the army on campaign, although they often served as garrison pieces. 5.5 inch howitzers, with their higher trajectory, were indispensable to attack an enemy inside a fortified position.

Gun detachments consisted of bombardiers, gunners, and less-qualified men called matrosses. Bombardiers were a unique rank to the artillery and were experienced gunners who had also achieved a certain degree of expertise in the preparation of ammunition. Gunners loaded and fired the pieces and were comparable to privates in the infantry line. Matrosses brought up the ammunition and moved the guns around the battlefield, allowing the gunners to service the piece. The duties of matrosses and gunners were often interchangeable. In the regular army, the manpower requirements for a single 6-pounder consisted of the gun commander (usually a non-commissioned officer), two gunners and six matrosses while militia units called for considerably more personnel.<sup>4</sup>

Service of the piece required both training and practice. Loading and firing the piece was hazardous to those who served the gun only once or twice a year. “One of the men who were firing the cannon got one of his hands shot off, and the other badly wounded,” wrote Elias Darnell of a militia artillery salute heralding their arrival in Dayton in 1812.<sup>5</sup> Militia man Joseph Henry described a similar mishap. “On this Day 5 Canon Lodes More at 12 o Clock shot of[f] and one man got his arm shot of and wounded in the Body with the swab and the other arm Brock.”<sup>6</sup>

But manning the gun was only one aspect of artillery employment. Gunnery, the ability to deliver accurate fires, was both an art and a science and the artillerist had to be a master of each.

Then as now, range to target was the determining factor in accurate gunnery. Each gun commander had to be able to estimate range, determine the time of flight for a fused round, decide upon the proper powder charge and the appropriate munitions, and choose the correct elevation to hit the target. Differences in terrain, air temperature, and tube wear contributed to accurate fire. After watching the fall of shot, the gun commander ordered the necessary corrections while matrosses manhandled the piece back into (hopefully) its original position and the gunners readied the piece for the next round.

Different types of artillery pieces required different skills. Crew and individual tasks associated with guns and howitzers, the tactical employment of heavy and light artillery, and whether the cannon were used as garrison or field artillery each required unique abilities. Field artillery guns were optically sighted and fired a flat trajectory. Depending upon the type of munitions used, these cannon were used against fortifications, to counter enemy artillery fire, and engage enemy personnel. Tactically, field artillery was most effective if several guns could be massed against a single target and the company commander was able to position his guns in relation to the supported infantry line. Unable to train in such tactics, most pre-war artillery companies in the militia, if in possession of a gun, used the piece to fire salutes to commemorate special events or provide noise and smoke to militia musters.

Unlike field guns, howitzers fired a relatively high angle trajectory and the howitzer gunner did not always need to see the target to attack it, although howitzers could engage in an anti-personnel role when needed. Using exploding shell, howitzers could engage targets on the reverse slope of a hill or behind breastworks or curtain walls. Howitzer gunners were able to fire from defilade positions and could mass their fires from disparate locations. It is for these reasons Harrison constructed the traverses in Fort Meigs.

Unfortunately, there were few manuals available to train new artillerists in either type of ordnance. What manuals did exist were translations of French manuals and contained much technical information that was neither useful nor applicable to militia artillery: metallurgy, field engineering, and construction of seacoast batteries, for example. These texts were both costly and scarce and were primarily used to instruct cadets at the recently established military academy. There was no basic manual available with which to train militia gunners.<sup>7</sup>

Unlike later wars when the army realized the gun itself was the company's best means of self-defense, the small arms each artilleryman carried were to protect the gun if infantry support was not available or the gun could not be pulled out of danger. Enlisted artillerists in both the militia and the regulars carried muskets of one type or another. In Ohio, militiamen were to arm themselves with a fusee, bayonet, cartridge box and twenty-four rounds of ammunition. All non-commissioned officers and officers were to carry a sword or hanger.

After the loss of the ordnance at Detroit and elsewhere, the Northwestern Army relied initially upon the Ohio militia to provide artillery support until regular army units could be fielded, despite the fact that Ohio militia units possessed only light field pieces. The Ohio Militia Act of 1808-1809 authorized one artillery company in each regiment and Ohio's militia laws specified, "That to every company of artillery, there shall be one captain, two lieutenants, four sergeants, four corporals, six gunners, six bombardiers, one drummer, one fifer and between twenty and thirty matrosses."<sup>8</sup> Unlike the regular artillery in which multiple guns comprised a company, an Ohio militia company was essentially a gun squad equipped with single cannon.

Before the War of 1812 began, Ohio had an accumulation of artillery pieces with little standardization of caliber. Contemporary accounts refer to a confusing collection of 4-, 8-, and 9-pounder field pieces scattered throughout the state, lacking carriages, implements, and harnesses. Three months before the war began, Ohio reported two understrength militia artillery companies totaling 86 men, armed with 15 swords and 25 fuses and each company equipped with a single 4-pounder.<sup>9</sup> In May 1812, the Ordnance Department loaned Ohio two, 6-pounder cannon barrels for the militia's use.<sup>10</sup>

On 3 March 1812, Colonel William Rayen, commander of the 1<sup>st</sup> Regiment, 3<sup>rd</sup> Brigade, 4<sup>th</sup> Division, Ohio Militia, directed an artillery company be raised by voluntary enlistment within his regiment. Thirty-five soldiers from Trumbull and Geauga Counties stepped forward. In the election that followed, James Hezlep, a store keeper from Poland, Ohio, won the election for company commander. Hezlep's company possessed an unmounted cannon, but had no horses or harnesses.<sup>11</sup> The piece itself was of doubtful utility. The War Department could not (and would not) furnish ammunition for a non-standard gun. 6-pounders had replaced 4-, 8 – and 9-pounder cannon for field service and the Militia Act of 1808 required the Ordnance Department to supply militia artillery with guns and ammunition identical to that of the regular army.

In July 1812, Major General Elijah Wadsworth, the 4<sup>th</sup> Division commander, ordered Hezlep to embody his company in anticipation of active duty. Hezlep was to alert his men, complete all necessary muster rolls, and ensure that arms and equipment were in order. Wadsworth added that the company would not be considered as in actual service until ordered to the field.<sup>12</sup> But it was not easy to prepare the company for active duty. Rayen notified Wadsworth of the difficulties Hezlep faced. "The artillery company is not yet in a situation to march. The officers is [sic] not yet commissioned nor the piece mounted." Rayen added that he had contacted the governor to see if the state would provide a carriage for the 8-pounder as well as small arms for the company, but had received no answer.<sup>13</sup>

Wadsworth wanted Hezlep's company to be part of Major William Cotgreave's combined militia force of infantry and light dragoons called out to reinforce Hull in Detroit. Hull's surrender of Detroit on 16 August resulted in a change of mission for the militia. No longer a supporting effort, they were now the main line of defense for northern Ohio. Ten days after the surrender and accompanied by two companies of infantry under Major Cotgreave, Hezlep's company left Warren, Ohio, for Wadsworth's headquarters in Cleveland with their gun mounted on a homemade carriage and a four-horse team pulling the field piece.<sup>14</sup> Wadsworth wrote the Secretary of War complaining about the cannon, "...we have one iron cannon an eight pounder, but nothing to load with. If it is to be made use of in the service, balls must be supplied & flannel."<sup>15</sup>

When the company arrived in Cleveland, it boasted thirty-three men: three officers, eight non-commissioned officers, six gunners, three bombardiers, one fifer, and twelve matrosses. Company strength throughout its service averaged between thirty-three and forty-six men; most of whom were matrosses. Their term of service was for six months.

Soon after his arrival in Cleveland, Hezlep exchanged his 8-pounder for a 6-pounder, possibly one of the two pieces Meigs had received from the War Department.<sup>16</sup> In late September, Major

Amos Stoddard, the Deputy Quartermaster General of Ordnance in Pittsburgh wrote Governor Meigs stating, “Two days ago I forwarded the following supplies to Genl. Wadsworth near Cleveland, viz, carriage and Harness for a six pounder”.<sup>17</sup> Hezlep’s men also received muskets, bayonets, and cartridge boxes. Shortly afterward, Hezlep now with Wadsworth’s militia force at Old Portage in present day Akron marched with Cotgreave’s force to the Huron River to join with Simon Perkins’ brigade.

Wadsworth had earlier sent about 400 men from Brigadier General Simon Perkins 3<sup>rd</sup> Brigade, 4<sup>th</sup> Division, Ohio Militia, to Huron, near modern day Milan, Ohio, to protect the Western Reserve. At Huron, Perkins’ militia began construction of Camp Avery, also called Camp Huron or Camp Perkins. Perkins arrived at the site in early October. He described Avery’s location as “on a hill with no way to the top except up from every side.”<sup>18</sup> The camp at Huron became the headquarters for the right wing of the Northwestern Army.

As part of the Avery garrison, Hezlep’s men participated in the normal camp routine and fatigue duties; Hezlep served as Officer of the Day about once every ten days. Hezlep drilled his company as best he could, but widespread sickness throughout the garrison complicated matters. And, as with other militia units, individuality was a trait of Hezlep’s men. Second Sergeant Joseph Applegate hired a substitute while at Avery to complete the final three months of his six month tour of duty.<sup>19</sup>

Samuel Huntington reported on the condition of the garrison at Avery. He found the men, “destitute of comfortable cloathing & many of them without shoes, Blankets, or a second shirt & pantaloons.” Knowing that winter was coming, Huntington recommended the men be issued with “public cloathing” or else they would have to go home on furlough to supply themselves.”<sup>20</sup> Shipments of shoes, stockings, blankets, and tents were then in transit to the right wing of the Northwestern Army, of which Perkins’ brigade was a part. Drab woolen roundabouts, wool overalls, and match coats followed in December.<sup>21</sup>

In November, Hezlep’s company moved to Lower Sandusky, present day Fremont, Ohio, with Perkins’ brigade as part of the push towards the Rapids of the Maumee River.<sup>22</sup> Hezlep’s company arrived at the Lower Sandusky post when construction of a road from Lower Sandusky to Upper Sandusky and a subsequent causeway through the Black Swamp to the Rapids had begun. Harrison wanted a road that would provide a major supply route from Cleveland and the east to the Rapids and the eventual site of Fort Meigs. A road through the swamp would also allow Harrison to concentrate more easily the three wings of his army in preparation for a drive on Canada.

On 10 January 1813, General Winchester with the left wing of Harrison’s army arrived at the Rapids. A week later, Harrison ordered Cotgreave, with Hezlep’s company, forward to support Winchester, a distance of 30 miles. To negotiate the Black Swamp, Hezlep’s men had to attach “drag ropes to the piece of ordinance [sic], and hitched themselves to one of the ox sleds”.<sup>23</sup> Harrison notified Winchester to expect reinforcements consisting of a “fine Battalion of Ohio infantry from the Connecticut reserve with a small artillery company and a field piece”.

Cotgreave's column left Lower Sandusky on 18 January, the same day Winchester skirmished with and defeated a combined British and Indian force on the River Raisin. Cotgreave arrived at the Rapids on Wednesday, the 20<sup>th</sup>. The column departed the Rapids the next day, initially marching on the ice of the frozen Maumee Bay, but the poorly shod oxen hauling the baggage sleds and artillery forced Cotgreave to double back and follow Hull's Road to Frenchtown.

Cotgreave was within 15 miles of the River Raisin when he learned of Winchester's defeat on the 22<sup>nd</sup>.<sup>24</sup> Cotgreave wrote his father a few days later, "In consequence of mismanagement in a waggon-master [we] was prevented reaching river Raisin on Friday morning". Ordered to fall back, Cotgreave described what happened next, "... we had to take in our arms a few of those which were fortunate enough to make their escape ... our baggage sleds were loaded with wounded and others who were overcome with fatigue ... and we were told without doubt we should have to fight for the preservation of ourselves; piece of artillery and military stores ..."<sup>25</sup> The British did not follow up on their success at Frenchtown and Cotgreave, with the rest of the Northwestern Army, fell back to the camp at Portage River.

On 2 February, Harrison began construction of Fort Meigs coinciding with the arrival of a train of artillery from Fort Fayette in Pittsburgh. This ordnance not only replaced the artillery Hull had surrendered at Detroit, but also provided the needed armament for Fort Meigs. Captain Daniel Cushing's company of the Second United States Artillery Regiment accompanied the train and his heavy artillery company would replace Hezlep's company whose time of service was soon to expire.

At Fort Meigs, Hezlep's company worked with Cushing's company to prepare the ordnance stores and assist in the camp's construction. When their tour of duty expired at the end of February, Hezlep's company turned over to the quartermaster its muskets, bayonets, and cartridge boxes as well as "three common tents, seven camp kettles, one bake oven, one pan, and two axes, the property of the United States."<sup>26</sup> The cannon remained at Fort Meigs.

Hezlep's company saw the most service of any of Ohio's militia artillery companies. In Cincinnati, Major General John S. Gano, the commander of the 1<sup>st</sup> Division of the Ohio Militia, attempted to form an artillery unit in Cincinnati with Joseph Jenkinson as the commander and Gano's son as Jenkinson's lieutenant. In January 1812, Gano wrote the state adjutant general for the needed cannon. "I am informed that the Governor has succeeded in obtaining a few pieces of ordnance [sic]. If the Artillery Company of this place could be furnished with one or more, it will be a great requisition as they may be acquiring a practical knowledge of Gunnery, etc., and may be useful in case of war, and I am anxious to preserve and encourage the military spirit which prevails in the officers and men in this Division", wrote Gano to Major General Van Horne, the state adjutant general.<sup>27</sup> A few weeks later, the governor responded to Gano's request, promising to send a gun to Cincinnati, adding, "My agent at Pittsburgh neglected to receive the Carriages & Implements attach'd to the Artillery. I have written to the Secy. of War for an order on the Military agent for their Delivery", wrote Meigs.<sup>28</sup>

Jenkinson's company possessed a cannon, but it, like Hezlep's 8-pounder, was of limited use. Gano described it as a "clumsy Navy piece that takes 2 lbs. of Powder for a load with only a

temporary carriage.”<sup>29</sup> Jenkinson and his men trained as best they could with it and used it to salute the soldiers assembling in Cincinnati to join Hull’s army in June.<sup>30</sup>

In early July 1812, Gano alerted the 1<sup>st</sup> Brigade of his Division to furnish, as part of the militia quota, one company of artillery to reinforce Hull in Detroit. Jenkinson’s company was to “equip themselves agreeable to Law and hold themselves in readiness to march at the shortest notice and complete Muster Rolls and Inspection Returns ...”<sup>31</sup> Gano repeated his request to Meigs that the company be “furnished with 2 good field pieces ...”<sup>32</sup>

In August, Gano redoubled his efforts to acquire a mounted field piece for Jenkinson as the time for departure drew near. “Request carriage be sent with the piece and I would thank you to use every exertion in hastening on the gun and ammunition – it takes such a quantity of powder of that will be wanting”, wrote Gano to the 1<sup>st</sup> Brigade Major.<sup>33</sup> Jenkinson’s company marched from Cincinnati and rendezvoused in Lebanon, hopeful that the piece would soon arrive. At Lebanon, Jenkinson’s company joined with five other militia companies where Jenkinson was elected major of this ad hoc infantry battalion. Jenkinson’s column moved on to Urbana where they joined with another battalion from Xenia and the combined force moved towards Piqua on 8 September. The cannon had arrived in Urbana a week earlier, but not in a field-ready condition. “The Cannon from Chillicothe is arrived -- The wheels are ready to put together,” General Tupper notified Meigs from Urbana.<sup>34</sup>

In early October, Governor Meigs detailed the disposition of the militia force near Manary’s Blockhouse, north of Urbana in Logan County. “We have with us a travelling Forge, 3 Ammunition waggons, 4 pieces of Artillery (type unknown), 1200 troops, one company of Spies, one company of Dragoons and, at last, have Tents and camp Equipage in good order.”<sup>35</sup>

Captain Alexander Gibson’s and his company from Butler County replaced Jenkinson. Like its predecessors, Gibson’s company was short lived. In early November, with at least one piece mounted, Gibson accompanied Tupper on his advance to the Rapids of the Maumee River with “a light six pounder pulled by six horses”.<sup>36</sup> One of the men on the expedition noted in his journal, they “found it impossible on account of miry roads to take it further along than the neighborhood of McArthur’s Blockhouse. The cannon and the other requisites belonging thereto were hid, but the horses were taken along.”<sup>37</sup> The gun was recovered the next day and taken back to McArthur’s Blockhouse. Shortly afterwards the term of service of Gibson’s company’s expired. The gun remained at McArthur’s Blockhouse for the next two months, where the garrison used it as a signal cannon and to fire welcoming salutes for General Tupper. In January 1813, Captain McNemar’s company moved the artillery to Fort Meigs.<sup>38</sup>

Governor Meigs, in an address to the Ohio legislature in December 1812, noted that three of the five artillery pieces belonging to the state were “completely mounted and harnessed and now in actual service,” but did not say where the guns were.<sup>39</sup> In March 1813, the Ohio General Assembly petitioned Meigs to request “the two six pounders at Zanesville and Marietta be mounted and equipped at the expense of the United States by applying to the War Office thereof for that purpose”,<sup>40</sup> but it is not clear if the guns were made serviceable and, if so, where they were sent. In May 1813, one account mentions Governor Meigs with 800 men and two 6-pounders on the road to Lower Sandusky after the British siege of Fort Meigs.<sup>41</sup> In mid-summer

1814, two mounted 6-pounders were reported at Fort McArthur. Regardless, the arrival of Cushing's heavy artillery company negated the need for the state to raise additional artillery militia companies to serve in the Northwestern Army.

From this point on, there is little mention of militia artillery and Ohio apparently did not raise any additional artillery companies. Although there seemed to be a surplus of 6-pounders, there was little need for field artillery and the men were needed elsewhere. The state's 1812 Militia Act decreed that a minimum of 45 men were required to constitute an artillery company, but stipulated that the company could not be formed if its manpower needs cost infantry companies the men they required.<sup>42</sup>

Even before Hull surrendered Detroit, the War Department recognized the need to expand the artillery branch of the regular army. Congress authorized the recruitment of a company of the Second Artillery in Ohio with Daniel Cushing as Captain and another company in western Pennsylvania under Stanton Sholes.<sup>43</sup>

The composition of Cushing's Ohio company was not vastly different from Hezlep's, although Hezlep's six month service obligation was significantly shorter than that of Cushing's regulars. Like Hezlep, neither Cushing, his officers, nor his men knew much about gunnery or the artillery service. The primary difference between Hezlep's and Cushing's company was Cushing's company was intended for garrison and siege operations, the type of campaigning Harrison envisioned would occur in the northwest.

Daniel Cushing had been a brigadier general in the Ohio militia before accepting a captain's commission in the Second United States Artillery Regiment. Charles Todd, the Eighth District's Acting Adjutant General described Cushing as a brave and industrious officer ... respectable in his deportment.<sup>44</sup> Initially, the War Department had offered command of the company to Charles M. Anderson, a Delaware businessman living in Chillicothe. Anderson received the appointment in March 1812, but committed suicide later that spring.<sup>45</sup> Daniel Cushing succeeded him in command in July. Cushing's officers were First Lieutenant Joseph Larwill of Wooster and Second Lieutenant Alexander Meek from the Indiana Territory. Larwill received his commission in March and Meek in May, 1812.

Cushing began recruiting for his company immediately after receiving his appointment. He ordered Larwill to recruit in counties surrounding Steubenville, telling him to also recruit for the infantry, "when that is preferred to the artillery."<sup>46</sup> In an advertisement in the *Lebanon Star*, Cushing sought volunteers to serve for five years although many recruits chose the eighteen month option. He offered the standard land bounties and bonuses to his recruits. But numbers never reached the authorized complement of 72 privates even though Cushing benefitted from the assistance of the federal recruiting service in Chillicothe.<sup>47</sup> Lieutenant Meek reported recruiting only six soldiers between June and August 1812, four of whom enrolled for 18 months and two for five years.<sup>48</sup>

Uniforms differentiated the militiaman from the regular and were an important part of the transition from civilian to soldier. In October, Major Tod, superintendent of Ohio's second recruiting district in Zanesville, directed Lieutenant Larwill to march his recruits from

Stuebenville to Chillicothe where they would be issued uniforms prior to joining Cushing at Piqua.<sup>49</sup> The uniforms issued to Larwill's men included linen jackets and overalls plus an equal number of chapeaus.<sup>50</sup> Colonel John Miller, superintendent of the federal recruiting service in Chillicothe, Ohio, received winter artillery uniforms intended specifically for Cushing in December 1812. The shipment included basic uniform items sufficient for about 85 men: shoes, coats, stockings, shirts, vests, wool overalls, and cap plates. Three months later, Miller received an additional shipment of uniform items for Cushing's company, many of which were either for summer usage or to complete the initial winter issue: drilling overalls, hats, knapsacks, cockades and eagles, feathers, and gaiters.

As the company was forming, Harrison lamented their lack of artillery experience. He wrote the Secretary of War, William Eustis stating, "A detachment of artillerists are much wanted from the Old Corps, I cannot suppose that the officers of the newly raised Reg't of which there is a Captain in this State understand much of their duty."<sup>51</sup> Harrison knew that Cushing's company was an orphan company and could not draw upon the training opportunities or leadership experience of its parent regiment. Cushing had little contact with either the regimental headquarters or his commanding officer, Colonel George Izard. Izard was in New York and what contact Izard did have with Cushing was primarily administrative; replacing missing commission certificates and verifying dates of rank for the Army *Register*.

To offset their inexperience, Harrison initially hoped to draw on artillerymen from Ohio's militia. Unfortunately, as he wrote Eustis, "Gov. Meiggs informs me that there are no Artillerists in Genl. Wadsworth's Division who have any practical knowledge of their duty. One or two Companies have been formed but they never had a field Piece until a few Weeks ago. I regret exceedingly that a Detachment from one of the Regular Regiments cannot be spared for this army." Harrison repeated this complaint a week later when he wrote Eustis "that the Corps of Artillery should be respectable for its number and knowledge of its duties" and requested a detachment from the regular artillery be assigned to his army.<sup>52</sup>

In response to Harrison, the Secretary of War ordered Major Amos Stoddard to report to Harrison as the Northwestern Army's senior artilleryman. Stoddard, an artillery officer commissioned in 1798, had been serving at Fort Fayette as a Deputy Quarter Master General for Ordnance and Ordnance Stores. More importantly, Stoddard was the author of the War Department's first official artillery drill and tactical manual, *Exercises for the Garrison and Field Ordnance together with Manoeuvres of Horse Artillery*. Harrison also had the benefit of two other trained officers: Captain Eleazer D. Wood and Captain Charles Gratiot. Both Wood and Gratiot were West Point graduates who, although commissioned as engineers, were trained artillerists.

Cushing left Franklinton (present day Columbus) at the beginning of January 1813 and arrived at Upper Sandusky on the 13<sup>th</sup> of that month. At Upper Sandusky, Cushing joined with the Petersburg Volunteers and the train of artillery Stoddard had sent to Harrison from Fort Fayette. Lieutenant Meek wrote Ohio militia general John Gano describing the train as consisting of five 18-pounders; eight 12-pounders; six 6 inch and 5.5 inch howitzers; and a mounted 6-pounder with the rest of the artillery on sleds.<sup>53</sup>

Upon learning of the train's composition, Harrison wrote Eustis, "I am much disappointed in the artillery which has been sent on. There are in all twenty eight pieces of which ten are six's and ten twelve pounders, the former are nearly useless. I had five before and if I had a hundred I should only take three or four with me. You will perceive by the return of Capt Gratiot which is enclosed that all the Carriages for the Howitzers and eight out of ten of those for the twelve pounders are unfit for use."<sup>54</sup>

Cushing arrived at the Rapids of the Maumee on 2 February with 43 soldiers, including officers and enlisted men. Cushing's second-in-command, Joseph H. Larwill had arrived at the Rapids earlier. Larwill was a surveyor in civilian life and had laid out the route for the artillery train to follow. He was at Fort Meigs assisting Captain Gratiot in construction of Fort Meigs when Cushing arrived. Cushing took charge of the construction of the grand battery, consisting of four, 18-pound cannons and completed it in mid-March. He described some of the additional defenses to Lieutenant Larwill who was then on furlough. "We have built two strong batterys in addition to the two that was built before you left ... the one in front mounts an 18 [pounder] and the one in rear a 12 [pounder]. The lower blockhouse on the point we have converted into a battery by taking of (sic) the Roff, Lowering the upper flower about 3 feet, building up a brestwork of dirt on the out Side, and planting an 18 [pounder] in it which commands the high nob opusent [opposite] to it".<sup>55</sup>

On 9 February, Harrison attempted a short-lived offensive operation against a large party of Indians on Presque Isle at the mouth of the Maumee River, about 14 miles from Fort Meigs. 600 men from Perkins' brigade led the advance. Harrison followed up with 400 additional soldiers. The column marched down the ice-covered Maumee River, the main body in front with the artillery about 100 yards behind. Lieutenant Larwill with 14 men commanded the 6-pounder. Near the mouth of Swan Creek, the gun and team broke through the ice into five feet of water. Larwill and a company of militia quickly recovered the horses and Larwill turned his attention to recovering the cannon and carriage. "I then sent 4 or 5 hands to the shore to cut hand spikes. 2 men took the cannon off the carriage and unlimbered the carriage, then [we] got all [carriage, gun, and limber] out. I had the cannon [re]mounted."<sup>56</sup> Larwill rejoined the main body the next morning near Presque Isle. When spies found no Indians in the area, the force returned to the site of Fort Meigs.<sup>57</sup>

In preparing for the defense of Fort Meigs, Cushing had too few soldiers with which to man the 28 guns. Detachments from Captain Holt's company and Captain Bradford's company, both from the 17<sup>th</sup> Regiment of United States Infantry, augmented Cushing's company as did several militia soldiers. It was this makeshift crew that defended Fort Meigs during the first siege. Alexander Bourne, one of the ad hoc artillerymen at Fort Meigs, described his experiences. "... I had never fired that gun before ... the first shot fell short of the battery – the second shot struck the side of the embrasure & threw up a splinter – the third shot silenced the enemy's gun for about two hours & that was the only opportunity I had to send them cold iron."<sup>58</sup>

Captain Daniel Cushing, in command of the fort's Grand Battery, wrote his family describing the artillery action. "on the 28 our Camp was surrounded with Indians and british kept up a Stedy fire at our pickets with their musketry, on the morning of the 28 we discovered the enemy's batterys on the other side of the River, they had commenced them in the night, we opened upon them with our 18 pounders from three of our batterys, keep them in play all Day, but in the night

they were very busy, and on the first day of May they had got their batterys complet and their guns all mounted Redy to give us battle, they gave us Several Shots from their gun boats about 2 o'clock in the morning, but without effect, the Shot did not reach our fort, at 8 o'clock they histed the Read flag, and saluted us with a 24 pounder, very quick, they bombarded us five day with Shot and Shell hot and cold, but all to no purps they could not drive us out, they fired in the 5 days 1676 shot and shells - they killed in the fort in that time 12 men and wounded about 20, some few of the wounded since dead.”<sup>59</sup>

One of the casualties in the siege was Amos Stoddard. Struck by a piece of exploding shell, Stoddard died of tetanus on 11 May. Curiously, the War Department did not send out a replacement for him nor is there any indication Harrison requested one. It's quite likely Harrison felt that Captain Wood could serve as the Northwestern Army's senior artilleryman.

Details are sketchy about artillery at other posts. Fort Stephenson at Lower Sandusky mounted a single 6-pounder commanded by “Sergeant Weaver with five or six gentlemen from the Petersburg Volunteers and Pittsburg Blues”. The piece was instrumental in repulsing the British attack of 2 August 1813. Harrison described the action in a letter to the Secretary of War, “... a six-pounder with half a load of powder and double charge of leaden slugs, at the distance of 30 feet, poured destruction upon them and killed or wounded nearly every man who entered the ditch.”<sup>60</sup> The armament of Fort Huntington, a star-shaped fort erected at the mouth of the Cuyahoga River to defend Cleveland, consisted of “one cannon mounted on wagon wheels”, possibly the same cannon Hezlep brought from Youngstown.<sup>61</sup> Fort Gratiot, at the head of the St. Clair River, was armed with nine artillery pieces served by Ohio militiamen.

The repulse of British spoiling attacks in Ohio and the defeat of British naval forces on Lake Erie, allowed Harrison to launch his invasion of Canada. Harrison knew that Perry's fleet could cover the landing, but mobile field guns would be needed to accompany the invasion force inland. But he was also under orders to protect Fort Meigs. “The best interpretation of the late movements of the enemy in your quarter is that De Rottenberg has detached to the aid of Proctor between four and five hundred men and, with these, he is attempting to save Malden by attacking fort Meigs,” wrote Secretary Armstrong to Harrison. Armstrong ordered Harrison to continue his operations against Malden and “leave Mr. Proctor to amuse himself with fort Meigs.”<sup>62</sup>

Harrison directed Cushing to remain at Fort Meigs. The general ordered Captain Stanton Sholes' company of the 2<sup>nd</sup> Artillery from Cleveland to Lower Sandusky on 8 September to participate in the planned invasion. The War Department had assigned Sholes to the defense of Cleveland and protection of Harrison's boat yard on the Cuyahoga River earlier that summer. With the lake safe after Perry's victory, Sholes' men brought the completed bateaux from Cleveland to the mouth of the Portage River (Port Clinton). Sholes, on furlough in Beaver, reported to Harrison on 16 September.

Harrison selected Captain Eleazer Wood to command the artillery during the invasion, no doubt because Sholes had little experience or training with field artillery tactics and, more importantly, Harrison knew Wood. Wood's artillery command consisted of Sholes' company and a portion of Cushing's company, totaling 130 men and eleven pieces of ordnance. On 15 September, Wood

began the embarkation of stores and artillery on the bateaux from Cleveland. Three days later, Wood, as part of McArthur's Brigade, made for Edwards Island.

Harrison's envisioned a two-pronged invasion of Canada. The amphibious landing below Malden was the main effort. A mounted column under Colonel Richard M. Johnson of Kentucky would conduct a turning movement to establish a blocking position near Sandwich and possibly attack Malden from the north. Harrison detached four, 6-pounders with ammunition wagons from Fort Meigs to accompany Johnson. The mounted column left Presque Isle on 26 September with orders to parallel as best as possible the invasion fleet.

Harrison anticipated an opposed landing. His invasion orders directed "A detachment of Artillery with a six, four, and three pounder and Howitzer will land with the light corps; the rest of the artillery will be held in reserve and landed at such points as Major Wood will direct."<sup>63</sup> During the invasion, Wood crossed the lake with six pieces mounted in bateaux – one gun in each – "loaded and with matches lighted".<sup>64</sup>

But the landing was unopposed. The Northwestern Army formed into two columns for the march to Amherstburg. Major Woods controlled the movement of the artillery. Perry's fleet provided cover. Amherstburg fell without a fight as did Sandwich (Windsor) and Detroit. Johnson's mounted force linked up with Harrison's at Sandwich on 1 October and joined in the pursuit of Proctor's retreating force. Woods and Sholes with two 6-pounders accompanied the pursuit, skirmishing with the Indians at Chatham's bridge on 4 October. The artillery was not engaged at the Thames.

After the battle, the American army fell back to the Detroit area and began rebuilding the fortifications at Amherstburg and Detroit. Detachments from the 2<sup>nd</sup> Artillery garrisoned these positions until the end of the war. Harrison, with the bulk of the Northwestern Army, was ordered to Newark, Upper Canada. Major Wood commanded the artillery detachment that accompanied Harrison from Detroit.<sup>65</sup> The remainder of Cushing's company moved forward from Fort Meigs to the Detroit area.

In December 1813, a combined force of British dragoons and militia surprised Lieutenant Larwill in command of a detail of soldiers from Detroit, who were on an expedition to administer oaths of loyalty to inhabitants along the Thames River. In the ensuing firefight, Larwill lost five men wounded and one man killed and he and his detachment captured. Larwill escaped while on parole and rejoined the army. Amid rumors of negligence and cowardice for his actions on the Thames, Larwill was transferred to the Corps of Artillery during the consolidation of the artillery branch in May and resigned in July 1814.

Because of Larwill's encounter and other minor clashes, Anthony Butler, commander of the American forces in the Detroit area, ordered Major Andrew Holmes on a raid against Port Talbot to discourage further British attacks. Even though the Thames campaign had demonstrated that the terrain of Upper Canada was not suitable for field artillery Holmes nevertheless took two field pieces with him on the expedition. Dragging the artillery, Holmes quickly discovered that he wasn't just fighting the enemy, he was fighting the terrain. Holmes later remarked on the obstacles he encountered. "I had been compelled to leave the artillery by the invincible difficulty

of the route ... No wheeled carriage of any kind ... will ever pass until the branches and fallen trees are cut away and the swamp causewayed or drained.”<sup>66</sup>

In December 1813, Harrison ordered Cushing, suffering from “indisposition”, on recruiting duty in Lebanon, Ohio. Sholes remained at Detroit, overseeing the artillery emplacements in Fort Shelby. Lieutenant James Pickett, a West Point graduate and U.S. Navy veteran, became the senior officer of Cushing’s company in Detroit. Pickett had joined Cushing’s company as a Third Lieutenant in August, 1813 to replace Lieutenant Meek who had been assigned as aide-de-camp to Brigadier General Duncan McArthur. Promoted to second lieutenant the following year, Pickett divided his small command of artillerists between Fort Shelby (Detroit) and Fort Gratiot. At Fort Gratiot, Pickett reported thirteen soldiers under the supervision of a militia officer and the remaining 39 at Detroit. At the end of the year, he reported two soldiers at Fort Gratiot, four at Fort Shelby, and fifty-two at Malden, with a company from the 27<sup>th</sup> Infantry Regiment augmenting the artillerymen at Fort Shelby.<sup>67</sup>

In the fall of 1814, the Adjutant General, concerned about the size of the artillery contingent in Detroit – then about 40 men - queried Major Charles Todd, the District’s inspector general, about Captain Cushing’s location. Informed that he was still on recruiting duty, the Adjutant General then ordered Brigadier General McArthur to organize the artillerists in the Detroit vicinity into a single company. If there were insufficient soldiers to fill out a company, Captain Sholes was to return to the recruiting service in Pennsylvania, where “by spring he may in all probability be able to return with a full company.”<sup>68</sup>

Sholes’ presence at Detroit was of dubious value. From 31 December 1813 until 18 April 1814, Sholes reported himself sick and unable to report for duty. On 30 April, Sholes requested and received two months furlough and returned home to Beaver, Pennsylvania. When Sholes returned to Detroit, Lieutenant Pickett wrote, “... the redoubtable Capt. Sholes arrived without condescending to take charge of his company, he devoted himself to making gun carriages ... I have the honor to command his damned scapegoat company at present ...”<sup>69</sup>

In fairness to Sholes, gun carriages were much needed at Fort Shelby. In October, the fort’s armament ranged from one 32-pounder and two, 24-pounders to a 12-pound carronade and an 8.5 inch howitzer. The other guns consisted of 18-pounders, 12-pounders, 6-pounders, and three brass 4-pounders, most lacking sound carriages.<sup>70</sup>

Sholes did not remain long at Detroit. Major Todd, replying to a War Department query concerning sending Sholes on recruiting duty, answered candidly: “The services of Captain Sholes in the field were of no importance to the U States.”<sup>71</sup> In December, the War Department ordered Sholes on recruiting service for the Corps of Artillery in Pennsylvania, noting, “the doubtful character of Captain Sholes will be best evaluated with his Corps.”<sup>72</sup> Pickett once again became the ranking officer at Detroit, responsible for mustering and reporting on the artillery, the militia, and the detachments of the 17<sup>th</sup>, 19<sup>th</sup>, and 28<sup>th</sup> Regiments of Infantry stationed there.

At the end of December 1814, Cushing notified McArthur, commander of the Eighth Military District, that he intended to move to Detroit and assume command of the artillery as soon as he obtained transportation for himself and his twenty-six recruits. He added that he had a large

quantity of artillery clothing on hand for the recruiting service, but had no one to whom he could transfer the uniforms.<sup>73</sup>

When the war ended, Lieutenant Pickett addressed the uncertainty facing the artillery service to former Lieutenant Larwill. "The military at this post is looking out for squalls. Disbandment and consolidation are the watchwords ... I am of the opinion that no part of the artillery will be disbanded. 4800 artillerists are certainly not too many for a frontier of 4 or 5000 miles."<sup>74</sup> Pickett was overly optimistic. The War Department retained him under the Peace Establishment, but the Corps of Artillery shrank to eight battalions of four companies each to man the coastal defenses.

During the three years of war, the artillery of the Northwestern Army faced numerous problems ranging from the mobility of the pieces to the quality and quantity of the ordnance available. Although their reports are silent on the matter, the difficulties Holmes and Woods encountered dragging field pieces through the wilderness involved more than just negotiating the broken and wooded terrain around Lake Erie's north shore. A 6-pounder required a four horse team to draw the gun plus additional horses to pull the ammunition wagons. Throughout its existence, the Northwestern Army faced enormous challenges obtaining not only a sufficient number of draft animals, but also the forage to feed them.<sup>75</sup> Harrison wrote to Eustis earlier in the war addressing the issue of forage, noting that two wagons carrying forage were needed to support each team.<sup>76</sup> For these, as much as any other tactical reason, field artillery played only a minor role in the Northwestern Army's operations.

Harrison's irritation over the number and types of guns sent to him and Meigs' frustration over obtaining carriages, harnesses, and implements were understandable, but the larger issue facing the Northwestern Army was its lack of trained artillerymen. Cushing's company and his hastily recruited cannoneers of the regular army were no better trained than their militia counterparts.

The War Department was well aware of the training deficiencies in both the militia and regular artillery. After the war, Secretary of War John C. Calhoun established the Artillery School of Practice at Fort Monroe, Virginia, in 1824 for the regular army. The curriculum concentrated on coast artillery operations, but also included artillery tactics, gunnery exercises, ballistics, mathematics, and metallurgy; subjects appropriate for the regular army, but not the militia.

In 1826, Winfield Scott headed a board intended to improve the militia of the United States. Among his recommendations was a proposal to prepare manuals appropriate for the militias' use. He noted, "Systems of a convenient size and form for the instruction of cavalry, artillery, and infantry, each bearing the official sanction of the government are much wanted by the militia." Despite this endorsement, nothing happened. The federal government did not adopt an elementary-level text for the militia nor did the Ohio legislature endorse a standard manual for the state's artillerymen. Scott's board also recommended that Camps of Instruction be provided the militia as neither Ohio nor any other state had training opportunities comparable to the Artillery School of Practice. The War Department ignored this recommendation, too.

Ohio embraced the concept of artillery companies in its legislation of the post-war era. State militia laws authorized two, one-gun companies for each brigade with a lieutenant colonel and a major in command. If enough interest existed, six, one-gun companies could be formed into an

artillery regiment under a colonel's command. Post-war militia laws mandated four days of training annually for artillery units: two at the company level, one day at the regimental level, and a fourth day as part of the brigade.<sup>77</sup>

Even with this modest legislation, the state generally neglected the militia and the artillery suffered as a consequence. Within twenty years of the war's end, training requirements dropped to twice a year, despite the fact that the size of the state's militia force increased from 5 divisions in 1814 to 17 in 1833 and Ohio received numerous artillery pieces under the provisions of the 1808 Militia Act.

From the end of the war through 1837, the Ordnance Department issued Ohio 71 iron cannons, complete with carriages, harnesses, and implements. The state Quartermaster General's Report for 1840 could account for just 42 cannon and then only since 1833.<sup>78</sup> In 1856, the Quartermaster General reported the state had received since 1812 forty-two, 6-pounder brass cannon; sixty-two, iron 6-pounders; two, 12-pounder brass cannon; and two, 12-pounder brass howitzers. He added, "... yet of all these pieces it is very doubtful if over ten of them can now be found in the State."<sup>79</sup>

In the immediate pre-Civil War period, the sole artillery unit within Ohio was a single regiment of six, one-gun batteries. Formally designated the 1<sup>st</sup> Regiment of Light Artillery, Third Brigade, Fourth Division, Ohio Volunteer Militia, the regiment was more commonly referred to as the Cleveland Light Artillery. The gunners had learned their duties through a combination of federal drill manuals and mentoring from out-of-state artillery companies. In May 1861, concerned about the threat from western Virginia, Governor Denison called out the unit to serve for ninety days. In many ways, the challenges the regimental commander faced preparing and deploying his unit for active service were identical to those that James Hezlep had encountered almost fifty years earlier. As the regimental historian recalled, "So the one hundred sixty fledglings from Cleveland with their guns and caissons, but without a single horse to move them, wanting clothing, rations, and ammunition, were hurried away to prevent the rebels from capturing Marietta"<sup>80</sup>.

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<sup>1</sup> E.A. Cruikshank, *Documents Relating to the Invasion of Canada and the Surrender of Detroit, 1812*, (Ottawa: Government Printing Service, 1913),156.

<sup>2</sup> "Return of Ordnance and Ordnance Stores Taken at Detroit, 16<sup>th</sup> August 1812", in E.A. Cruikshank, *Documents Relating to the Invasion of Canada and the Surrender of Detroit, 1812*, (Ottawa: Government Printing Service, 1913), 159.

<sup>3</sup> H.S.Knapp, *History of the Maumee Valley Commencing with its Occupation by the French in 1680*, (Toledo: Blade Publishing House, 1872), 145.

<sup>4</sup> See Donald E. Graves, "Field Artillery of the War of 1812: Equipment, Organization, Tactics and Effectiveness." *The War of 1812 Magazine*, (Issue 12: November 2009) for a review of British and American artillery during the war. Accessed 22 October 2011, [http://napoleonseries.org/military/Warof1812/2009/Issue12/c\\_Artillery.html](http://napoleonseries.org/military/Warof1812/2009/Issue12/c_Artillery.html).

<sup>5</sup> Elias Darnell, "A Journal of the Hardships, Battles, etc. of those Heroic Kentucky Volunteers and Regulars in the Years 1812-1813", *The Magazine of History*, Extra No. 31(New York: Wm. Abbatt, 1914), 6.

<sup>6</sup> Joseph Henry's Diary, 22 January 1814, Ohio Historical Society

<sup>7</sup> See Donald E. Graves, "For want of this precaution ... many Men lose their Arms; Official, Semi-official, and Unofficial American Artillery Texts, 1775 – 1815", Part 2, *Military Collector and Historian*, vol. 63, No 3 (Fall 2012) for a thorough discussion of the manuals available to the artillery.

<sup>8</sup> Salmon P. Chase, ed., *Statutes of Ohio and the Northwestern Territory adopted or enacted from 1788 to 1833 inclusive*, Vol. 1, (Cincinnati: Corey and Fairbank, 1833), 545.

<sup>9</sup> *Niles Weekly Register*, Vol. 2, March 21, 1812, accessed 17 February 2012, <http://www.archive.org>.

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- <sup>10</sup> Meigs to Eustis, Urbana, 18 September 1812, National Archives (NA), RG 107, M221, Roll 47. Also, RG 156, Records of the Office of the Chief of Ordnance, Entry 118, "Ledger and Journal of Ordnance Stores Issued to the Militia", vol. 1.
- <sup>11</sup> Wadsworth to Eustis, Cleveland, 7 September 1812, *Document Transcriptions of the War of 1812 in the Northwest: Letters to the Secretary of War Relating to the War of 1812 in the Northwest*, Vol. 6. (Richard C. Knopf, Anthony Wayne Parkway Board. Columbus: Ohio State Museum. 1957).
- <sup>12</sup> Wadsworth to Perkins, Canfield, 4 July 1812, Elijah Wadsworth Papers, MSS 2729, Roll 1, Western Reserve Historical Society.
- <sup>13</sup> Rayen to Wadsworth, Youngstown, 11 July and 7 August 1812, Simon Perkins Papers, MSS 3122, Container 39, Western Reserve Historical Society.
- <sup>14</sup> Perkins to Harrison, Huron, 9 November 1812, Perkins Papers.
- <sup>15</sup> Wadsworth to Eustis, Cleveland, 7 September 1812, *Document Transcriptions of the War of 1812 in the Northwest: Western Reserve Historical Society Collection War of 1812 Collection*, Vol. 10. (Richard C. Knopf, Anthony Wayne Parkway Board. Columbus: Ohio State Museum. 1957). The flannel was needed for cartridge bags.
- <sup>16</sup> General Wadsworth requested through the state adjutant general that the 6-pounder in Zanesville be sent to Cleveland for his use. Even though the cannon was not mounted, the citizens of Zanesville refused to comply with the request and Wadsworth had to look elsewhere. Van Horne to Wadsworth, Zanesville, 25 August 1812, Zanesville, *Document Transcriptions*, Vol. 10.
- <sup>17</sup> Stoddard to Meigs, Pittsburgh, 22 September 1812, *Document Transcriptions of the War of 1812 in the Northwest: Return Jonathon Meigs and the War of 1812 in the Northwest*, Vol. 2. (Richard C. Knopf, Anthony Wayne Parkway Board. Columbus: Ohio State Museum. 1957).
- <sup>18</sup> Marjorie L. Cherry, *Blockhouses and Military Posts of the Firelands*, (Shippensburg: PA, 1934), 36.
- <sup>19</sup> Rachel Applegate pension request, 11 December 1850, Accessed 2 October 2011, www.Fold3.com.
- <sup>20</sup> Huntington to Eustis, Camp at Portage, 10 October 1812, *Document Transcriptions*, Vol. 6.
- <sup>21</sup> Eustis to Wadsworth, 10 October 1812, *Document Transcriptions*, Vol. 10.
- <sup>22</sup> Shannon to Wadsworth, Camp Avery, 28 September 1812, *Western Reserve Historical Tract No. 91*, "Northern Ohio during the War of 1812", (The Western Reserve Historical Society, Cleveland: 1913), 71. The post at Lower Sandusky occupied the former site of a government factory and later became known as Fort Stephenson.
- <sup>23</sup> Cotgreave to Perkins, Camp West side Miami, 21 January 1813, *Tract 91*.
- <sup>24</sup> Harrison to Armstrong, Miami Rapids, 20 January 1813, *Document Transcriptions*, Vol. 6.
- <sup>25</sup> Cotgreave to Father, Camp at Carrying River, 25 January 1813, reprinted in *Trump of Fame*, 3 February 1813.
- <sup>26</sup> Receipts dated 25 and 26 February 1813, Miami Rapids, Western Reserve Historical Society, MSS 2025, Folder 7 and MSS 660, Folder 3.
- <sup>27</sup> Gano to Van Horne, Cincinnati, 20 January 1812, Gano Papers, *Quarterly Publication of the Historical and Philosophical Society of Ohio*, Vol. 15, 48.
- <sup>28</sup> *Ibid.*, 51.
- <sup>29</sup> *Ibid.*, 71.
- <sup>30</sup> Martin Andrews, comp. and ed., *History of Marietta and Washington County, Ohio and Representative Citizens*, (Biographical Publishing Co., Chicago: 1902), 554.
- <sup>31</sup> Militia Orders, Cincinnati, 10 July 1812, Gano Papers, 79.
- <sup>32</sup> Gano to Meigs, Cincinnati, 1 July 1812, Gano Papers, 71.
- <sup>33</sup> Gano to Major Barr or Stanley, Springfield, 25 August 1812, Gano Papers, 94.
- <sup>34</sup> Tupper to Meigs, Urbana, 30 August, *Document Transcriptions*, Vol. 2.
- <sup>35</sup> "Extract of a letter from His Excellency R.J. Meigs to a gentleman in this place, dated Oct. 8, 1812", published in *Western Spectator* (Urbana), 17 October 1812, Microfilm Roll 25190, Ohio Historical Society Collection.
- <sup>36</sup> Tupper to Meigs, McArthurs' Blockhouse, 9 Nov 1812, *Document Transcriptions*, Vol. 2.
- <sup>37</sup> James Ohle transcriber, *Journal of Nathan Newsome*, (Columbus: Anthony Wayne Parkway Board, 1957).
- <sup>38</sup> "We Lay There Doing Nothing: John Jackson's Recollection of the War of 1812", Jeff L. Patrick, ed. *Indiana Magazine of History*, 88 (June 1992).
- <sup>39</sup> *Niles Weekly Register*, 9 January 1813.
- <sup>40</sup> "Resolution of Ohio General Assembly", March 1, 1813, *Document Transcriptions, Letters to the Secretary of War, 1813*, Vol. 7.
- <sup>41</sup> Cotgreave to Wadsworth, 15 May 1813, *Document Transcriptions*, Vol. 10.

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- <sup>42</sup> Salmon P. Chase, ed., *Statutes of Ohio and the Northwestern Territory*.
- <sup>43</sup> Captain Samuel Price recruited for the Regiment of Light Artillery throughout the spring of 1813 in Kentucky, but had little interaction with Cushing or the 2d Regiment of Artillery. The Regiment of Light Artillery was recruited throughout the United States and Price's recruiting efforts were intended to feed recruits into the regiment then headquartered in New York state. The War Department did not envision a company of light artillery for service in the western part of the United States. The scarcity of horses and forage in the Eighth Military District negated the mobility aspect of the light artillery. Regardless, in the Northwest, firepower was of more importance than mobility; particularly for the siege and garrison role that Harrison envisioned. When ordered to Fort Meigs in 1813, accounts suggest Price served as an infantry officer, killed during the siege. It is not known if he offered his artillery expertise to Cushing's company. Both Cushing's and Larwill's diaries are silent on the subject.
- <sup>44</sup> Todd to Bell, Chillicothe, 10 December 1814, NA, RG 94, M566, Roll 59.
- <sup>45</sup> Handwritten note in Anderson's file; NA, RG 94, M566, Roll 6.
- <sup>46</sup> Tod to Larwill, Zanesville, 30 June 1812, Larwill Family Papers, Collection, Ohio Historical Society.
- <sup>47</sup> Smyth to Miller, 10 Sep 1812, NA, RG 94 M565, Roll 4.
- <sup>48</sup> Larwill Family Papers
- <sup>49</sup> Tod to Larwill, Zanesville, 11 October 1812, Larwill Papers
- <sup>50</sup> NA, RG 92, Office of the Quartermaster General, Receipted Invoices, Office of the Military Storekeeper,
- <sup>51</sup> Harrison to Eustis., Piqua, 24 Sep 1812, *Governor's Letters and Messages*, Vol. 2, 1812-1816, Logan Essary, ed. (Indianapolis: Indiana Historical Society, 1922), 151.
- <sup>52</sup> Harrison to Eustis, 15 and 22 October, *Document Transcriptions, William Henry Harrison and the War of 1812 in the Northwest*. Vol. 1.
- <sup>53</sup> Meek to Gano, 18 January 1813, Gano Papers, *Quarterly Publication of the Historical and Philosophical Society of Ohio*, Vol. 6, (1921).
- <sup>54</sup> Harrison to Eustis, HQs, Delaware, 12 December 1812, *Document Transcriptions*, Vol.1.
- <sup>55</sup> Cushing to Larwill, 13 January 1813, Fort Meigs, Larwill Family Papers.
- <sup>56</sup> Larwill diary entry, 9 February, Joseph H. Larwill Papers, Burton Historical Collection, Detroit Public Library.
- <sup>57</sup> Handwritten remarks by Elisha Whittlesey, 21 June 1860, inserted in *The Trump of Fame*, 17 February 1813, Ohio Historical Society, Roll 233.
- <sup>58</sup> Colonel Alexander Bourne, "The Siege of Fort Meigs, Year 1813", *Northwest Ohio History*, Vol. 17 (1945), 151.
- <sup>59</sup> P.L Rainwater, ed., "The Siege of Fort Meigs", *Mississippi Valley Historical Review*, Vol. 19, No. 2 (September, 1932), 263.
- <sup>60</sup> Harrison to Armstrong, Seneca Town, 4 August 1813. Esary, *Governors Letters and Messages*, 54.
- <sup>61</sup> William R. Coates, *A History of Cuyahoga County and the City of Cleveland*. (Chicago: American Historical Society, 1924), 91; also, Wilfred H. Alburn, *This Cleveland of Ours*, (Chicago: S.J. Clarke, 1933), 1339.
- <sup>62</sup> Armstrong to Harrison, 5 August 1813, Thomas H. Palmer, *Historical Register of the United States*, Part 2, State Papers Laid Before Congress, 2d Session, 13<sup>th</sup> Congress, (Philadelphia, G. Palmer: 1814), 87.
- <sup>63</sup> General Orders, 27 September 1813, Esary, *Governors Letters and Messages*, 547.
- <sup>64</sup> Eleazer D. Wood, "Journal of the Northwestern Campaign of 1812-13, under Major General William H. Harrison" in *Campaigns of the War of 1812-15*, (New York, James Miller, 1879). 410.
- <sup>65</sup> General Orders, Newark, 11 November 1813, Orderly Book of a Rifle Detachment Composed of Several Companies from Several Rifle Regiments, 9<sup>th</sup> Military District, 1813 to 1815, NA, RG 98, Records of US Army Commands, Entry 52.
- <sup>66</sup> Holmes to Butler, Fort Covington (Amherstburg), 10 March 1814, *Historical Register*. The Loyal Essex Rangers discovered the two abandoned field pieces and ammunition wagons Holmes had hidden, destroyed the carriages, and cached the ammunition and cannon in a black ash swamp.
- <sup>67</sup> Report of Artillery at Detroit, 31 December 1814, McArthur Papers, Library of Congress.
- <sup>68</sup> Adjutant and Inspector General to McArthur, 12 October 1814, NA, RG 98, M565, Roll 5.
- <sup>69</sup> Pickett to Larwill, Detroit, 23 Oct 1814, Larwill Family Papers.
- <sup>70</sup> Inspection Report, Pickett to McArthur, October 1814, McArthur Papers.
- <sup>71</sup> Todd to Bell, Chillicothe, 10 December 1814, Accessed 8 May 2012, [http: www.fold3.com](http://www.fold3.com).
- <sup>72</sup> Adjutant and Inspector General to Todd, 21 December 1814, NA, RG 94, M565, Roll 5.
- <sup>73</sup> Cushing to C.S. Todd, Lebanon, 24 December 1814, McArthur Papers.

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<sup>74</sup> Pickett to Larwill, Detroit, 15 March 1815, Larwill Family Papers. When Pickett left the army on 15 June 1815, he held the rank of Captain. The Army had asked him to remain with the artillery but he declined. He returned to Kentucky and entered a legal clerkship and read Law. Finding military life more fulfilling he re-entered the Army as a Captain. From 16 June 1818 until his honorable discharge on 1 June 1821 he served as an Assistant Deputy Quartermaster General of the Army.

<sup>75</sup> Numerous accounts describe the difficulty Harrison and others had acquiring sufficient forage for the Army's animals. Hopkins' troop of the 2d Light Dragoons were dismounted and served as foot soldiers during the invasion of Canada because of the want of forage for their mounts. Supply trains from Chillicothe, Franklinton, and elsewhere carried forage for the teams as so little was available in and around Fort Meigs and Detroit. As a point to consider, archaeological excavations at Fort Meigs have yielded the remains of just two horse skeletons, perhaps attesting to the fact that few animals stayed at Fort Meigs because of the lack of forage.

<sup>76</sup> "Col. Morrison believes that it will require two Waggons [sic] with corn to support their own teams and one other with flour to that place (Upper Sandusky) and back again." Harrison to Eustis, Franklinton, 15 November 1812, *Document Transcriptions*, Vol. 1.

<sup>77</sup> Militia Act, 14 February 1815, Chase, *Statutes of Ohio and of the Northwest Territory*, Vol. 2.

<sup>78</sup> Ohio General Assembly. *Documents, Messages and other Communications made to the Thirty-Eighth general Assembly of the State of Ohio*, "Report of the Ohio Quartermaster General, 25 February 1840", Document Number 93, Table A, (Columbus: Menary, 1840)

<sup>79</sup> Ohio. *Messages and Reports made to the General Assembly and Governor of the State of Ohio for the Year 1856*, "Annual Report of the Ohio Quartermaster General", (Columbus: State Printer, 1856).

<sup>80</sup> *Reminiscences of the Cleveland Light Artillery*, (Cleveland: Cleveland Printing Company, 1907), 27.